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For many industrialized countries, monetary policy has, from time to time, switched between
high and low inﬂation regimes. These regimes seem to be associated with higher and lower
rates of money growth, respectively. There is a liquidity eect associated with changes in
regime. For example, following a switch from high to low money growth (inﬂation), the
nominal interest rate rises sharply and there is a contraction in economic activity.1 These
eects appear to be long lived. Finally, following a regime change, inﬂation expectations
seem to adjust slowly to reﬂect the prevailing stance of monetary policy. That is, it seems
to take time for the central bank to establish a reputation for being tough on inﬂation, or
conversely to lose such a reputation.
Figures 1{4 summarize Canadian evidence in support of the three observations listed
above. As shown in Figure 1, between 1955 and 1970 Canadian monetary base growth was
relatively low and stable, averaging around 2.7% per annum. The 1970s were characterized
by sharply higher money growth rates, averaging in the neighborhood of 8% per annum.
Since the early 1980s, monetary policy seems to have tightened with money growth rates
once again averaging around 3% per annum. The broader monetary aggregates share the
secular movements displayed by the monetary base.
The liquidity eect can be clearly seen in the Canadian data in Figures 3 and 4. In
particular, notice the sharp rise in the nominal interest rate in the early 1980s as monetary
base growth plummeted. At the same time, real output growth also fell precipitously, leading
to the worst recession in post-war Canadian history.
Finally, Figure 2 shows that inﬂation tends to lag money growth. In the early 1970s, the
rise in inﬂation followed that of money growth with a lag of around two years. Similarly,
inﬂation fell in the early 1980s, following money growth with a lag of two to three years.
To the extent that expectations of inﬂation are reﬂected in the nominal interest rate, Figure
3 provides some evidence in support of this `sticky expectations' hypothesis. In particular,
note how long it took for the interest rate to rise during the `loose-money' regime of the
1970s, and how long it took for the interest rate to fall during the `tight-money' regime of
the 1980s.
Friedman and Schwartz (1963) has long inﬂuenced the interpretation of the eects of U.S.
monetary policy. The evidence summarized in their work is broadly consistent with the rst
two facts listed above. Specically, Friedman and Schwartz describe alternating periods of
price stability and of inﬂation which are associated with changes in the growth rate of money
(regime changing behavior), and periods of severe economic contraction which are associated
with substantial falls in the stock of money (the liquidity eect). More recently, Romer and
Romer (1989) have combined the narrative approach of Friedman and Schwartz with more
formal statistical methods. Romer and Romer nd that episodes of contractionary monetary
policy are followed by severe and long-lasting contractions in real output (the liquidity eect).
Both Friedman and Schwartz (1963) and Romer and Romer (1989) argue that these episodes
of monetary contraction are exogenous events, not the endogenous response of the Fed to
1Friedman (1968) appears to be the rst to have coined the term `liquidity eect.' While he used this
term to refer to changes in output following a change in monetary policy, others have expanded `liquidity
eect' to include nominal interest rate movements as well.
1economic developments.
Ricketts and Rose (1995) formalize the casual observation that industrialized countries
appear to switch between periods of low and high inﬂation. They estimate Markov switching
models for each of the G7 countries. For the most part, Ricketts and Rose nd that these
countries have switched between periods of low and high inﬂation, with stability of the
inﬂation process within an inﬂation regime.
Until recently, existing dynamic general equilibrium monetary models have been unable
to explain why the interest rate rises and output falls in the wake of an exogenous monetary
tightening. Consider what happens in a cash-in-advance economy like that of Cooley and
Hansen (1989).2 Provided money growth rates are positively autocorrelated, a fall in the
money growth rate signals, on average, lower future money growth. Since current labor
earnings cannot be spent until next period, households are willing to work more since the
inﬂation tax has fallen. Consequently, output will rise and the nominal interest rate will fall.
In this environment, monetary policy operates primarily through an anticipated inﬂation
eect.
Lucas (1990) and Fuerst (1992) embed a `limited participation' feature into an other-
wise standard cash-in-advance model; this allows a monetary shock to dierentially aect
economic actors. The idea is that households are less frequently in contact with nancial
markets than the business sector. They assume that households cannot immediately adjust
their portfolios in the face of a monetary shock while rms can. In the Lucas{Fuerst model,
goods producing rms borrow to nance their wage bill. In response to an unanticipated
contraction in cash reserves of the banking sector, the nominal interest rate rises in order to
equilibrate the loan market. Ceteris paribus, a higher interest rate increases the cost of labor,
reducing the quantity of labor demanded, and so lowering output. However, the anticipated
inﬂation eect is still in operation, and it is unclear which eect dominates. Christiano
(1991) shows that for empirically relevant money growth processes, the anticipated inﬂation
eect swamps out the liquidity eect in the Lucas{Fuerst model. A further shortcoming of
this model is that it cannot generate a persistent liquidity eect: output and the interest
rate respond in the right direction only in the period of the shock.3
In this paper, we explore a mechanism for propagating the eects of monetary policy
over time. In keeping with the observed behavior of money growth described above, we
assume that monetary policy is governed by periodically shifting policy regimes that manifest
themselves as dierent `long run' growth rates of money.4 In particular, we assume that a
component of monetary policy follows a regime-switching process in a manner similar to
the way Hamilton (1989) modeled output growth for the U.S. economy. We consider an
information structure in which agents in our model economy are unable to observe the current
monetary policy regime, and so must make inferences over the regime based on observed
money growth rates.5 The eects of a disinﬂation are propagated over time since beliefs
2Similar results are seen in shopping time and `shoe leather' models of model.
3Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992) and Cooley and Quadrini (1998) show that portfolio adjustment
costs can generate a persistent liquidity eect.
4Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) also consider regime changes, allowing for periodic shifts in the mean
money growth rate. They do not restrict the long run money growth rate to lie in a two point set.
5Since the money growth process is exogenous, absent are the strategic considerations analyzed by Backus
and Drill (1985).
2(the probability assigned to, say, the low money growth regime) evolve slowly. Inﬂation
expectations also react sluggishly, allowing the liquidity eect to dominate for some time.
The economic environment is described in Section 2. The model is calibrated in Sec-
tion 3. The parameters governing monetary policy, including the transition probabilities of
regimes and the `long run' money growth rates, are estimated by applying the Hamilton
(1989) Markov regime switching estimator to Canadian monetary base growth. The key
results of the paper can be found in Section 4 which analyzes the behavior of the model
economy following a monetary policy regime change. Section 5 reports the welfare benet of
a disinﬂation policy. In Section 6, we consider a particular episode in Canadian history: the
disinﬂation of the early 1980s. Like Friedman and Schwartz (1963) and Romer and Romer
(1989), we interpret this episode as an exogenous tightening of monetary policy, and think
of this experience as being akin to a `natural experiment.' Section 7 concludes are oers
suggestions for future research.
2M o d e l
2.1 Households
Time is discrete and denoted by t =0 ; 1 ;:::;1. Individuals have preferences dened over













The specication of the expectation operator E0 will vary depending on the information
structure assumed; this will be discussed in greater detail below. The household is endowed
with one unit of time per period, which it divides between labor (Nt) and leisure;
Nt + Lt =1 : (2)
At the beginning of period t, the economy's money supply Mt is held by households in
the form of `cash' Mc







One can think of Mc
t as money held in a checking account that earns zero interest and Md
t
as money held in a savings account (one-period term deposit) that earns nominal interest
Rt > 0. A key assumption of the model, in terms of generating a liquidity eect, is that the
composition of money holdings in the current period has been predetermined by a portfolio
decision made in the previous period. A checking account is held by households since cash
3is required to purchase consumer goods. In particular, there is a cash-in-advance constraint
on consumption purchases given by
M
c
t  PtCt for all t; (4)
where Pt is the price level.
At the end of period t, the household receives money income Yt from three separate
sources: wage income, interest income, and dividend income. Let Wt denote the nominal
wage rate so that nominal wage income is WtNt. The household's term deposit generates
interest income RtMd
t . Dividend income accrues from ownership in business sector equity,




remitted by rms and banks, respectively.6 Thus, end-of-period money income is given by
















t −P tC t) : (5)





t+1 j t  0g








0 0, with expectations E0 formed rationally under the assumed informa-
tion structure.
2.2 Firms
Firms produce output Qt with capital Kt and labor Ht according to a constant returns to
scale production function F:
0  Qt  F(Kt;H t); (6)
where F(K;H)=K H 1 − . The capital stock is owned by the rm, but labor must be rented
at wage Wt. Assume that rms must borrow money from a nancial intermediary at interest
rate Rt in order to nance their wage bill WtHt, but that rms are able to extend credit to
each other for the purpose of nancing capital expenditures It. After output is produced,
consumer goods are delivered to households for cash, while capital goods are sold to rms
(in eect, capital goods are retained as productive inventories by the business sector). Cash
earnings do not arrive in time to nance the period wage bill. Consequently, after business
6We assume, without loss, that shares in business sector equity are not traded.
4loans to intermediaries are paid back and after capital expenditures are undertaken, the rm
remits any remaining cash as a dividend payment to households;
D
f
t = PtQt − PtIt − (1 + Rt)WtHt: (7)
New capital goods It are used to augment the future capital stock in the business sector;
Kt+1 =( 1− ) K t+I t; (8)
where 0    1 is the rate at which capital depreciates.
Firms choose a contingency plan fQt;H t;I t;K t+1;D
f
tjt0gto maximize the expected,







subject to (6){(8), given a stochastic process for fPt;W t;R t; tjt0g and given K0  0,
with expectations formed rationally under the assumed information structure. For rms to
act in the best interests of their shareholders, the stochastic discount factor t+1 should







At the beginning of period t, the nancial intermediary sector receives a cash injection Xt
from the monetary authority; this cash, together with the loanable funds Md
t provided by
households, is supplied inelastically to rms at interest rate Rt. The interest rate charged
on loans is the same as that paid on deposits since nancial intermediation is assumed to













=( 1+R t) X t
(9)
which is remitted to households.
2.4 Monetary Policy
Monetary policy is exogenous. Let t denote the growth rate of the money supply so that
Mt+1 − Mt = tMt = Xt;
with M0 > 0g i v e n .Amonetary policy regime is associated with a `long-run' rate of monetary
expansion ^ t, where for simplicity we assume only two regimes:
^ t 2f  L; Hg
5with L < H. Monetary policy regimes switch back and forth over time according to a
Markov transition law with known parameters:
ij =P r [ ^  t= jj^  t − 1= i] i;j = L;H: (10)
Of course, ^ t represents a `long-run' money growth rate only to the extent that LL and HH
are in some sense `close' to unity.
Monetary growth is assumed to ﬂuctuate within each regime according to a station-
ary rst-order Markov process (representing monetary control errors) so that actual money
growth evolves according to:
t − ^ t =  (t−1 − ^ t−1)+ t (11)
with j j < 1a n dw h e r e tis a random disturbance drawn from a Normal distribution function
N(0; 2
i), with density denoted by fi() for i = L;H.
2.5 Information Structure
Below, we consider two information structures that are distinguished by whether or not in-
dividuals are assumed to observe regime types. Under complete information, an individual's
information set at date t includes the set
Ωt = f^ t; ^ t−1; ^ t−2;:::g;
that is, individuals are assumed to know which monetary policy regime is and has been in
place. Under incomplete information, individuals are unable to observe the regime-type so
that Ωt is not a part of the information set.
2.6 Competitive Equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium for this model economy is dened in the usual way. Given a
stochastic process for prices fPt;W t;R t; tjt0gand given the behavior of the government











optimally. In a competitive equilibrium, these choices are required to be consistent with the
following market-clearing restrictions:








t + Xt = WtHt
Nt = Ht;
which represent the goods, money, loans and labor markets, respectively.7
7The appendix provides a detailed account of the restrictions characterizing the model's equilibrium.
6It is instructive to review some of the properties of the competitive equilibrium by con-
sidering, for example, how the economy reacts to an unanticipated reduction in the rate
of money creation. Generally speaking, there are two basic economic forces at work that
respond to such a disturbance; these forces have been labeled the anticipated inﬂation eect
(or the Fisher eect) and the liquidity eect. Below, we discuss both eects in turn.
To the extent that money growth rates are positively serially correlated, the unanticipated
reduction in money growth signals the likelihood of lower money growth rates in the future,
leading individuals to revise downward their forecasts of future inﬂation. Since inﬂation acts
as a tax on labor earnings, the anticipation of lower inﬂation increases the expected return
to working and hence leads to an increase in the supply of labor (for any given real wage).
At the same time, lower expected inﬂation implies a lower nominal interest rate through the
Fisher eect, which has the eect of increasing the demand for labor (at any given wage).
As both the supply and demand for labor rise in response to the anticipated inﬂation eect,
the labor input and hence output expands, while the interest rate fall.
The liquidity eect generates forces that work in the opposite direction. The unantici-
pated reduction in money growth means that the period cash injection from the monetary
authority is lower than expected, leading to an unanticipated shortfall of loanable funds.
Consequently, goods producing rms are induced to bid up the interest rate in an attempt
to secure the cash loans that they need in order to nance the period labor input. Normally,
rising the interest rate would induce a portfolio substitution on the household side: indi-
viduals would want to economize on cash balances and increase their deposits at nancial
intermediaries. However, to the extent that households do not respond instantaneously to
changes in monetary policy (as is assumed in the environment above), this response is ruled
out (at least, temporarily). Thus, the interest rate rises leading to a fall in labor demand
and a decline in output. In this way, the liquidity eect causes output to contract and the
interest rate to fall, an eect that is opposite from the anticipated inﬂation eect. In equi-
librium either eect may dominate depending on the conguration of the model's parameter
values.8
2.7 Beliefs
When monetary policy is noncredible, individuals are compelled to infer the nature of the
true regime based on any relevant information at their disposal. Given the exogenous nature
of monetary policy, it is clear that the only information useful for inferring regime-type
will be based on the known parameters governing money growth rates and on observations
of current and past money growth rates Γt = ft; t−1; t−2;:::g, together with any prior
information.
Let bt  Pr[^ t = LjΓt] denote the probability that an individual assigns to the current
regime being a tight-money regime, based on information Γt. Assume that b0 is given and
common across all individuals. Individuals are assumed to enter period t with belief bt−1
(which has been formed on the basis of information Γt−1 and b0); individuals then observe t,
update their beliefs and undertake their economic decisions. Under rational expectations,
the belief sequence fbtg will obey the recursion (Bayes' rule):
8See Christiano (1991) for further details.
7bt =
gL(bt−1; t)
g L(b t−1; t)+g H( b t − 1; t)
(12)
where
gL(bt−1; t)b t−1 LLfL(t −  t−1 −(1 −  )L)
+( 1−b t − 1)  HLfL(t − t−1 −L + H);
gH(bt−1; t)b t−1 LHfH(t −  t−1 −H + L)
+( 1−b t − 1)  HHfH(t − t−1 −(1 −  )H):
The function gL represents the likelihood that an individual attaches to being in the tight-
money regime at t, given his prior belief bt−1 and the current money growth realization t.
The rst term is the product of: (1) the probability attached to being in the tight-money
regime last period, (2) the probability of no regime transition, and (3) the probability of
observing the current money growth rate given no transition. Likewise, the second term is
the product of: (1) the probability attached to the loose-money regime being in place last
period, (2) the probability of making the transition from the loose-money to the tight-money
regime, and (3) the probability of seeing the current money growth rate given this transition.
Similarly, gH is the likelihood attached to being in the loose-money regime, given the prior
belief and current money growth realization.
There are several things to note about beliefs. First, the statement that an individual
believes that the central bank is, say, a tight-money type should be interpreted as meaning
that the individual assigns a higher probability to the central bank being a tight-money type
than a loose-money type. Provided that all the probabilities in (12) lie strictly between 0
and 1, an individual will never be absolutely certain as to the central bank's type.
Second, learning will occur. For example, suppose that at time t an agent assigns a high
probability to the tight-money regime (bt ' 1). Further suppose that the true regime is
loose-money. Given a sequence of money growth rates that are more likely to have been
generated by the loose-money regime, Bayesian updating implies that the individual's belief
will begin to fall. For a long enough sequence, an individual's condence in the tight-money
regime will eventually approach zero.
Third, an agent may believe that he is currently dealing with a loose-money central
banker, while the central banker may in fact be a tight-money type. On the one hand, an
individual may correctly believe that he has been dealing with a loose-money central banker,
but the central banker type may have recently changed and the individual has not yet seen
enough low money growth rates to infer a change in policy. On the other hand, the central
banker may be a tight-money type, but by chance there have been a series of relatively
high realizations of money growth rates. Thus, individuals may incorrectly infer a change in
monetary policy when there has, in fact, been none.
Notice that, depending on the parameters governing the rate of monetary expansion,
beliefs about regime-type may adjust very slowly. Because inﬂation forecasts will depend
on beliefs over the state of monetary policy, expectations of inﬂation may therefore exhibit
some sluggishness as well. As such, the anticipated inﬂation eect described in subsection
82.6 will tend to be muted in response to surprise changes in monetary policy, an eect that
may have important economic consequences, for example, with respect to the net welfare
benet of undertaking a disinﬂation policy.
3 Calibration
The parameters of the model are given by
Preferences: ;!;γ
Technology: ;
Monetary Policy: L; H; LL; HH; ; L; H.
The parameters for preferences and technology are assigned values that are standard in the
real-business-cycle literature (eg., Prescott, 1986). In particular, assuming quarterly time
periods, model calibration requires  =0 : 99, ! =0 : 275, γ =1 : 5,  =0 : 36, and  =0 : 025.
The parameters governing the money growth process are estimated via maximum like-
lihood by applying Hamilton (1989)'s regime switching model to data on per capita base-
money growth for Canada over the sample period 1955:2{1996:1. In estimating these pa-
rameters, the econometrician is assumed not to observe the shifts between regimes; instead,
probabilistic inferences (beliefs) must be made based on the observed behavior of the series.9
The actual estimation was undertaken with a GAUSS program written by Hamilton. This
particular program does not estimate all of the parameters of interest in a direct manner. In
particular, the code delivers estimates for L; ; L; H together with 1; 2; 3 where these
latter variables are related to the parameters of interest according to:
H = L + 1
LL =e x p [ − (  2)
2]
 HH =e x p [ − (  3)
2] :
The parameter estimates are given in Table 1.10
The estimation procedure appears to identify long-term trends in the growth rate of per
capita base money (as opposed to a trend that shifts at business cycle frequencies). The
sample likelihood is maximized by tight-money growth rate of 0:7 7 %p e rq u a r t e r( 3 : 12%
per annum) and a loose-money growth rate of 2:67% per quarter (11:12% per annum).
The average duration of a loose-money regime is estimated to be (1 − 0:9637) −1  28
quarters, while the average duration of a tight-money regime is considerably longer at (1 −
0:9922)−1  128 quarters. The rst-order serial correlation in money growth (for either
regime) is estimated to be 0:2514, which contrasts with a common estimate of around 0:55
for linear models. It is interesting to note that the Gaussian component of money growth
9As in the Kalman lter, one is using the time path of an observed series to draw inferences about
an unobserved state variable. While the Kalman lter is a linear algorithm for generating estimates of a
continuous unobserved state variable, the Hamilton lter is a nonlinear algorithm and provides inferences
over an unobserved discrete-valued variable.
10The initial belief b0 was set equal to it's unconditional mean: (1 − HH)=(2 − LL − HH).
9Table 1: Parameter Estimates
Parameter: L H LL HH   L  H
Estimate: 0.0077 0.0267 0.9922 0.9637 0.2514 0.0104 0.0077
Standard Error: 0.0013 0.0846 0.0007 0.0011
Parameter: 1 2 3
Estimate: 0.0190 0.0886 0.1925
Standard Error: 0.0024 0.0464 0.0862
exhibits a higher percentage volatility in the tight-money regime. In particular, the standard
deviation in the innovation to money growth in the loose-money regime is 0:77% compared
to 1:04% for the tight-money regime. For these parameter estimates, the standard deviations
for the `monetary control' error in the loose-money and tight-money regimes are 0:80% and
1:08%, respectively. Thus, the `noise' around each regime is small relative to the dierence
between average money growth in each regime (2:67% − 0:77% = 1:90%).
Figure 5 depicts the actual money growth series together with the estimated belief that
the monetary authority is following a tight-money program at any given date, conditional on
currently available information. Throughout most of the sample period, Bayesian individu-
als would have displayed a high degree of condence in their inferences about regime-type.
Over the 1955{71 sample period, belief in the tight-money regime rarely dipped below 75%.
By 1972, persistently high money growth realizations had persuaded individuals that the
monetary authority had switched to a loose-money policy{a belief that remained fairly en-
trenched until around mid-1979. The subsequent two years appear to be characterized by
a considerable amount of uncertainty on the part of market participants in terms of ex-
actly which monetary regime was thought to be in place. In late 1979 and early 1980,
relatively low money growth realizations induced a rising belief in the tight-money regime,
but a burst of high money growth in 1980 dashed this perception. As money growth fell in
early 1981, belief in the tight-money regime again began to grow; by late 1981, with the per
capita money supply actually contracting, condence in the tight-money regime is estimated
to have been well-established. Belief in the tight-money regime appears to have remained
strong throughout the remainder of the sample.
4 Results
4.1 Transitory Shocks
Figure 6 displays the dynamic impulse-response functions of the complete information model
to a one-standard-deviation shock in the growth rate of money in the tight-money regime.
In the impact period of the shock, the interest rate falls by about 2 percentage points while
output rises by almost 0:5 percent (relative to its long-run level in the tight-money regime).
In the period following the shock, output rises above its previous level while the nominal
10interest rate falls below its prior level. The dynamics die out fairly quickly thereafter with
both output and the interest rate remaining close to their stationary values under the tight-
money regime. Thus, on impact at least, the model is able to generate a signicant liquidity
eect. It is interesting to note how this result diers from that reported in Christiano (1991),
where a similar experiment yields a rise in the interest rate and a reduction in output. For
the parameterization considered by Christiano the anticipated inﬂation eect of a monetary
disturbance evidently outweighs the liquidity eect. One likely explanation for Christiano's
result is his specication of a relatively high value for the autoregressive coecient on money
growth (between 0:32 and 0:80), which is demanded by empirical plausibility, given his
assumed structure for the monetary disturbance.11
The dynamic response of our model economy to a transitory monetary disturbance under
incomplete information is virtually indistinguishable from the complete information case
(there is a slight dierence in the second period of the shock). Examining the evolution of
beliefs in Figure 6 reveals why this is the case. Given that the economy has settled into
a long-run associated with a tight-money policy, the transitory increase in money growth
is interpreted by individuals for what it is: a short-lived monetary control error. Thus,
condence in the tight-money regime falls, but not by much quantitatively.
4.2 Disinﬂation Policy
In this section, the quantitative eects of a change in regime are examined. The precise
nature of the exercise is as follows. Decision rules for the model economy are obtained using
the computational procedure described in the appendix, with all stochastic elements in play.
During a simulation, the stochastic nature of the monetary control shock is suppressed and
the monetary regime is forced to remain in one regime. The economy is then allowed to
settle into a stationary state. In period zero, there is a regime shift (loose-money to tight-
money, or vice-versa). The time series behavior of key aggregate variables is then recorded
under the assumption that the new regime remains in place indenitely (of course, individual
decision rules continue to incorporate the possibility of future regime changes as well as other
monetary disturbances).
In this section, we focus on the regime change associated with a disinﬂation policy,
under both complete and incomplete information. Results for this experiment are displayed
in Figures 7{9. The bottom panel of Figure 7 reveals that this disinﬂation policy has a
very dierent impact on output growth depending on the structure of information. In the
complete information case, the disinﬂation policy generates an immediate boom, with an even
stronger eect in the subsequent period. The level of output settles into a new stationary
state roughly 2% higher than the previous stationary state. In contrast, when monetary
policy is noncredible, the disinﬂation policy actually induces a brief recession with output
falling almost 0:5%, followed by an economic boom. Notice that the adjustment to the new
stationary state is more protracted than in the complete information case. The reason for
this drawn out transition is that the belief over the regime takes 3{4 quarters before locking
11In our estimated monetary growth process, there are two sources of persistence: (1) within-regime
persistence as modeled by the AR coecient  ; and (2) the persistence of regimes as modeled by the
transition probabilities HH; LL. Christiano (1991) attributes all persistence to the AR coecient.
11in on the low money growth regime; see the top panel of 7.
Figure 8 records the level eects on labor market variables of the disinﬂation policy
(measured as percent deviations from their long-run levels associated with the loose-money
regime). Under complete information, the labor input expands rapidly, initially overshooting
its long run increase of 2:5% (as with output, relative to the previous stationary state). As
labor expands relative to the capital stock, labor productivity falls accordingly. The real
wage initially drops somewhat and then rises to a level slightly above its initial steady-state
level. To understand why the real wage rises while labor productivity falls, recall that the
demand for labor depends negatively on the nominal interest rate. Thus, while a lower
inﬂation tax increases the supply of labor, the lower interest rate also increases the demand
for labor. If the latter eect dominates, then the real wage will rise. Under incomplete
information, the dynamic response of the labor input and productivity are initially quite
dierent than under complete information (although the real wage behaves similarly). On
impact, employment falls by almost 0:6% while productivity rises by about 0:2%; each of
these variables then take about a full year to reach their new steady-state values.
Figure 9 traces the evolution of the nominal interest rate, the inﬂation rate, and the
one-period-ahead forecast of inﬂation following the disinﬂation policy. Under complete in-
formation, the interest rate initially rises by 0:9% points, but then quickly falls to its lower
steady-state value. On impact, the policy change actually induces a short-lived deﬂation, an
event that is brought about by the suddenly lower rate of money expansion together with
an expansion in the rate of output growth. Notice that expectations of inﬂation adjust very
rapidly.12
The short run dynamics in the incomplete information case dier considerably from the
complete information scenario. On impact, the nominal interest rate rises by 3:27% points
before falling below its previous level. As with the real variables discussed above, adjustment
to the new stationary state is sluggish. Relative to the complete information case, inﬂation
appears to be `stickier'. The reason for this is that the contraction induced by the change
in policy serves to keep prices high. Finally, observe that expectations of inﬂation evolve
sluggishly relative to the complete information case.
4.3 Expansionary Monetary Policy
In this section we will examine the eects of switching from a tight-money regime to a
loose-money regime; the results are recorded in Figures 10 and 11. Consider the response
of output to this inﬂation policy (bottom panel of Figure 10). Under complete information,
it appears that the eect is virtually the mirror image of the events following a disinﬂation
policy. Interestingly, under the incomplete information case, the quantitative eect is not
the mirror image of a disinﬂation policy. For example, in the impact period of the shock,
output growth rises 0:7% above its previous stationary state, and remains 0:25% above in
the following period, before falling below. More dramatic dierences are to be found in the
relative transition dynamics. In particular, under incomplete information it takes roughly
12Also note that expected inﬂation does not correspond to actual inﬂation even in the `long-run' states of
the economy. The reason for this is that individuals continue to attach some probability to a regime change.
126 quarters for output to make most of the adjustment its new stationary value, whereas it
only took 3 quarters following a disinﬂation.
This experiment reinforces the observation that slow adjustment of beliefs lies at the
heart of the dierences in the short run dynamics between the complete and incomplete
information versions of the model (compare Figures 7 and 10). Under the inﬂation policy,
beliefs take signicantly longer to adjust than under the disinﬂation policy. The intuition for
this result lies in the estimated transition probabilities. Recall that the quarterly probability
of remaining in the loose-money regime is just over 96%, while the probability of remaining
in the tight-money regime is over 99%. Thus, regime changes are more likely to occur under
the loose-money regime. Consequently, in a loose-money regime, Bayesian individuals are
more inclined to interpret low money growth realizations as indicating a probable regime
change. Under a tight-money regime, the probability of a regime change in any quarter
is extremely unlikely; as a result, individuals are more reluctant to interpret high money
growth realizations as reﬂecting a change in regime: relatively more realizations are required
for individuals to become convinced of a regime change in this latter case.
Figure 11 records the impact of the inﬂation policy on the money market variables.
Under complete information, the interest rate, inﬂation rate and expected inﬂation rate are
all mirror images of the disinﬂation policy. In contrast, under incomplete information, the
dynamics are drawn out considerably relative to the disinﬂation policy. In particular, notice
that the nominal interest rate falls on impact and takes 3 quarters before rising beyond its
initial value; under the disinﬂation policy, the nominal interest rate rose on impact and took
only half a year before falling below its initial value. Finally, observe that when information
is incomplete, the inﬂation policy results in negative (ex post) real rate of interest lasting
just over a year.
4.4 Sensitivity Analysis
The results discussed in this section are robust to empirically relevant changes in the pa-
rameter values governing money growth. From Table 1, most of these parameters are tightly
estimated, and one or two standard error changes to individual parameters would have little
quantitative eect, much less qualitative eect.
The transition probabilities, LL and HH, are less precisely estimated. The eect of,
say, lowering LL to that of HH are virtually the mirror image of the results presented
in subsection 4.2. In general, the higher are LL and HH, the longer are the transition
dynamics under incomplete information.
Another key parameter is 1 = H−L which governs the dierence between the long run
money growth rate in the two regimes. Reducing the value of this parameter by one or two
standard errors makes the regimes less distinct, and so makes it more dicult for agents to
distinguish between the two regimes. Not surprisingly, such a change causes beliefs to behave
more sluggishly, drawing out the transition under the incomplete information case. However,
since the regimes are more similar, regime changes have smaller long run real eects.
13Table 2: Welfare Benet of a Disinﬂation
Welfare Benet (  100)




In this section, we attempt to measure the welfare benet of implementing a disinﬂationary
policy. To begin, imagine that the economy has settled into a `long-run' situation consistent
with the loose-money regime having been in place for a long period of time. Now, imag-
ine that the loose-money regime actually remains in place for the foreseeable future (e.g.,
5000 quarters); let (cH
t ;` H
t ) denote the consumption-leisure decisions made by individuals in











The payo V H can be computed for both the complete and incomplete information environ-
ments.
Now, suppose that in the same long-run situation, the monetary regime actually switches
to a tight-money regime for the next 5000 periods. Let (cHL
t ;` HL
t ) denote the equilibrium
consumption-leisure decisions associated with this realization and let yHL
t denote the realized













when  = 0. Our measure of the welfare benet of switching (permanently) from the loose-




The parameter  represents the fraction of income that an individual would (in retrospect)
have been willing to sacrice for the opportunity of living with the disinﬂation policy.
Table 2 summarizes the welfare benet of switching to a tight-money regime. For com-
parison with previous literature, the welfare benet is also calculated ignoring transitional
dynamics. To begin, notice that the welfare gures computed across `long-run' states are
in the neighborhood of those reported in the literature (eg., Cooley and Hansen, 1989);
13Clearly, the realized sequence of consumption and leisure will in this case be constant (the monetary
control errors are also suppressed). Note, however, that individuals still anticipate the possibility of a regime
change at each date.
14i.e., around 0:25% of income (in perpetuity) for the 7:6 percentage point fall in inﬂation
(from 10:7% to 3:1%). Accounting for the transitional path has a signicant impact on the
measured welfare benet of disinﬂation. Compared to either the complete or incomplete
information cases, ignoring transitional eects overstates the welfare benet by over a factor
of two. Thus, the already modest estimates of the welfare costs of inﬂation reported in the
literature are likely overestimates. Finally, notice that the welfare benet of a disinﬂation
under incomplete information is higher than under complete information.
6 The Role of Noncredible Monetary Policy: 1979{
1984
In Canada, the late 1970s and early 1980s was a period that witnessed a transition from
a high-inﬂation environment to a low-inﬂation environment. As mentioned earlier, a shift
in monetary policy is generally credited with this development; but monetary policy is also
held partly responsible for the contraction in economic activity experienced in the early 1980s
as well as for the extended period of high interest rates prevailing in that decade. In this
section, we attempt to evaluate the likely empirical relevance of noncredible monetary policy
in Canada over this historical period in the context of the quantitative theory developed
above.
In the experiments undertaken below, the actual money growth process for Canada over
this time period is treated as a realization from the estimated stochastic process governing
monetary policy. This realization is then used in conjunction with the equilibrium decision
rules to compute the predicted time path of key economic aggregates under each of the
complete and incomplete-information versions of the model. Any discrepancy that exists
between the predictions of these two versions of the model is then treated as an estimate of
the quantitative importance of noncredibility.
As regime-type is not observable, the predictions of the model under complete information
must be conditioned on the date at which monetary policy is assumed to have switched. In
the analysis below, two such dates are considered: the fourth quarter of 1979 and the rst
quarter in 1981. These dates are chosen on the basis of the estimated behavior of beliefs. In
particular, at both of these dates, belief in the tight-money regime began to grow signicantly.
In the former case, condence in the tight-money regime began to decline somewhat after
the initial rise, but it is unclear whether this decline was attributable to some unfortunate
monetary control errors that occurred in the tight-money regime, or whether the growing
condence in the tight-money regime in early 1980 was mistakenly made on the basis of
some unlikely monetary control errors generated by the loose-money regime.
Figure 12 plots the predicted path for output growth (deviation from trend), the interest
rate, expected inﬂation and beliefs for the incomplete information model. Given the pattern
of money growth realizations, the model predicts a moderate boom in early 1980, close to
trend growth over late 1980 and 1981, followed by some rather severe ﬂuctuations in 1982.
In the second quarter of 1982, annual growth in real per capita output in the model falls
close to ten percentage points below trend growth, an event that the model attributes to the
ten percent contraction in the supply of money that occurred in that quarter. The interest
15rate remains high on average throughout most of the sample period, showing temporary
declines in 1980:2 and 1982:1, followed by a more persistent decline by the third quarter of
1982. Inﬂation forecasts began to decline in the latter part of 1979, but a burst of relatively
high money growth realizations during 1980 caused inﬂation expectations to rise again. In
1981, a series of relatively low money growth rates resulted in a gradual decline in inﬂation
expectations as individuals became condent that the tight-money regime was in place.
Figure 12 also plots the pattern of output growth, the interest rate and inﬂation expec-
tations predicted by the complete information model under the assumption that the actual
regime change occurred in the fourth quarter of 1979. The model estimates little dierence
in output growth had monetary policy been fully credible. The most signicant impact of a
credible monetary policy would have been on the behavior of the interest rate and inﬂation
expectations. Under a fully credible regime change in 1979:4, the model predicts that the
annual interest rate would have been on average four percentage points lower throughout the
1980{81 period. Although the interest rate is predicted to remain high through the better
part of 1982, this is true for both information structures: the model attributes the high inter-
est rate prevailing over this latter period to the shortfall in liquidity following some unusually
low money growth realizations in that period and not to the lack of policy credibility.
In Figure 13, the model's predictions are again reported under both information struc-
tures, but now with the assumption (for the complete information model) that the regime
change actually occurred in the rst quarter of 1981. In this scenario, as in the rst, non-
credibility appears to have only a negligible impact on real output growth. However, the
model suggests that in this case, the interest rate over the 1979{80 period would have ac-
tually been higher under a credible monetary policy, since individuals would have realized
that the loose-money regime was still in place while under noncredible policy, individuals
would have mistakenly inferred the likelihood of a regime change. Once the regime change
does take place, credibility implies that the interest rate falls quickly while under noncredi-
bility, the interest rate remains higher than warranted by the true state of monetary policy
throughout 1981. The economic consequences of noncredibility are estimated to have been
fully dissipated by early 1982.
7 Conclusion
This paper has explored some of the theoretical and quantitative properties of a dynamic
general equilibrium model that features stochastic regime changes in monetary policy under
alternative information structures reﬂecting extreme views on policy credibility. For empir-
ically relevant parameter values, it was demonstrated how the implementation of a credible
disinﬂation policy resulted in a period of economic expansion and a lower interest rate, while
the implementation of a noncredible disinﬂation policy resulted in recession and temporarily
higher rate of interest. When the model was used to interpret the disinﬂation era of the
early 1980s in Canada, it was estimated that the main impact of policy noncredibility was
in keeping inﬂation forecasts and the interest rate signicantly higher than was warranted
by the true state of monetary policy. Furthermore, while monetary policy was estimated to
have had a large negative impact on output growth in the second quarter of 1982, policy
noncredibility per se likely contributed very little to the depth and length of the 1981{82
16recession.
The analysis above is obviously very exploratory in nature; a number of interesting
directions for future research are immediately apparent. To begin, the limited participation
model of money utilized above makes some rather extreme assumptions concerning the ability
of individuals to substitute into and out of cash; see Dotsey and Ireland (1995). It would
be of interest to re-evaluate the quantitative importance of slowly adjusting beliefs in the
context of a better model of money. Exploring the welfare implications of policy credibility
within the context of such a model would also be of interest; see Moran (1997) for some
preliminary work in this area. Second, our analysis restricts monetary policy to be one of
two regimes. Extending the analysis to incorporate the possibility of several regimes would
likely result in beliefs that are even slower to adjust to policy changes. Third, a promising
extension would be to endogenize monetary policy so as to evaluate the role of strategic
interaction between policy makers and the general public in belief formation. Finally, to
the extent that the monetary authority is bound by scal considerations, one may wish to
model a policy regime in terms of the state of scal policy, as in Ruge-Murcia (1995). For
example, the rate of expansion of the federal debt in Canada rose sharply throughout the
rst half of the 1980s, following the sharp contraction in monetary policy. If the probability
of a transition to a loose-money regime increases (or is perceived to increase) with rapidly
expanding government debt, then inﬂation forecasts may have rationally displayed continued
persistence even following the disinﬂation policy of the early 1980s.
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19Appendix: Solving for Equilibrium
A.1 Households
Let St denote the economy-wide state vector (to be specied shortly), so that (Mc
t ;Md
t;S t)
is the state vector for a representative household. Let V (Mc;Md;S) be the maximum utility




































t 0 for all t. Assuming an interior solution, the rst-order necessary
conditions are given by:
U1(t)=P t 2 t
U 2( t )=W t 1 t
EtV1(t+1 )= 1 t
EtV2(t+1 )= 1 t:
By the envelope theorem,
V1(t)= 2 t
V 2( t )=( 1+R t)  1 t:


















Condition (A.1) governs the accumulation of cash balances. The left-hand side measures
the cost associated with earning an extra dollar at date t (working a little more at the
nominal wage Wt) while the right-hand side represents the expected benet of having an
extra dollar available at date t + 1 (spending that dollar on consumption). Condition (A.2)
governs the accumulation of deposits. Again, the left-hand side is the utility value of one
m o r ed o l l a ra td a t et . If this dollar is deposited, rather than held as cash, then the individual
earns (1 + Rt+1) dollars in the subsequent period, which are valued at the margin by the
(discounted) expected utility value of money at date t + 1. With cash balances determined,





The representative goods-producing rm begins the period with capital stock Kt.L e t
J ( K t ;S t) denote the maximum expected value of the rm in state (Kt;S t); this value function
must satisfy









where we have exploited condition (A.1) to substitute out for the discount factor EtU1(t+
1)=Pt+1. Optimal decisions for the rm are characterized by the following rst-order condi-
tions:
PtF2(t)=( 1+R t) W t (A.4)
PtU2(t)
Wt
= EtJ1(t+1 ) ;
with J1(t) given by the envelope theorem
J1(t)=
P tU 2( t )
W t
[ F 1( t )+1−]:










Condition (A.4) equates the marginal product of labor with the real cost of labor to
the rm (which includes its interest rate payments necessary to nance the period labor
input). Condition (A.5) governs the accumulation of capital. The left-hand side represents
the cost (to shareholders) of a one unit reduction in dividend income, while the right-hand
side represents the expected discounted utility value of the extra output generated by a one
unit investment in capital goods.
A.3 Market-Clearing Restrictions
Goods, labor, credit and money market-clearing require the following conditions to hold:
Ct + Kt+1 = F(Kt;H t)+( 1−) K t (A.6)
Ht = Nt (A.7)
M
d





t+1 = Mt+1 (A.9)
(A.10)
21with the money supply/injection evolving according to
Mt+1 =( 1+ t) M t or Xt = tMt: (A.11)
The restrictions (A.1){(A.11) jointly characterize a stochastic process




t+1;M t+1(Xt);P t;W t;R tg:
A.4 Transformation
Since money grows over time, nominal variables must be transformed so as to render them
stationary. To this end, deﬂate all nominal variables by the period money stock and denote























Using the labor market clearing condition (A.7) to eliminate Ht, the system of equations

































1+ t=w tN t+m
c
t (A.17)
Ct + Kt+1 = F(Kt;H t)+( 1−) K t (A.18)
where the restrictions mc
t + md
t =1a n dx t= thave been employed above. The system
(A.12){(A.18) now characterize a stationary stochastic process
fCt;N t;K t+1;R t;p t;w t;m
c
tg:
A.5 The Aggregate State Vector
The economy-wide state vector for both the complete and incomplete information model
is given by the 4-tuple St =( K t ;m c
t; t;b t), where recall that bt represents the probability
that individuals attach to the tight-money regime after observing the current money growth
realization t. Under complete information, bt is equal to either zero or unity depending on
which regime is actually in place. Under incomplete information, bt varies continuously be-
tween zero and unity, depending on observed money growth rates and the Bayesian updating
formula.
22In presenting the model and the associated equilibrium restrictions, no explicit distinction
was made between the complete and incomplete information environments. In eect, the
expectations operator hides this distinction. In the complete information case, individuals
must concern themselves with both the possibility of a regime change and the distribution
of the monetary control error (under each regime). Thus, the conditional expectation of a
random variable zt+1 = z(t+1)i sg i v e nb y





Under incomplete information, the expectation of zt+1 is conditioned on a current belief bt











for bt 2 [0;1].
A.6 Solution Method
Equilibrium decision rules and pricing functions are obtained computationally by applying an
Euler equation iteration technique developed by Coleman (1991). Equations (A.1){(A.18)
represent a system of nonlinear second-order dierence equations. Coleman's algorithm
reduces this system to a set of rst-order dierence equations by conjecturing candidate
decision rules and pricing functions, and interpolating these functions when evaluating the
expectations in (A.13), (A.14) and (A.16). The decision rules and pricing functions are then
updated by solving the set of nonlinear rst-order dierence equations. The algorithm iter-
ates on these decision rules and pricing functions, terminating when two successive solutions
are deemed suciently similar. The expectations in (A.13), (A.14) and (A.16) are evaluated

















































































































(d) Money Base and M3
Figure 1: CANSIM Labels: B1646 (Monetary Base); B1627 (M1); B1630 (M2); B1628 (M3);
D1 (Population). All monetary aggregates have been deﬂated by the population; quarterly





























Figure 2: CANSIM Label: D20556 (GDP Deﬂator). Quarterly rates of change in the price
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Interest Rate
Figure 4: CANSIM Label: D20463 (Real GDP). The output measure has been deﬂated by the














































Figure 5: The growth rate in the monetary base is as described in Figure 1 (without smooth-
ing). The initial belief was set to its unconditional mean.







































































































(b) Output and the Interest Rate
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































(d) Money Growth and Belief
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(d) Money Growth and Belief
3
4